Demonstration 1 of 4
Same machine, different regions
Does one machine design pay everywhere, or only where labor is dear and energy cheap?
The machine trades labor for energy. Its gain rises with the wage and falls with the energy price, so the same design crosses the zero NPV line in one price setting and not in another.
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The machine costs F = $9,600, saves 720 labor hours a year, uses 600 energy units and $480 of maintenance, lasts five years and is discounted at 8 percent. w is the hourly wage, p_e the energy price, G the annual gain and A_5 the annuity factor.
Predict first. Is the machine profitable where labor is cheap ($4.50) and energy dear ($1.80)?
Choose an example
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Constructed example: constructed teaching numbers, not historical data. The book's invented machine with region H (wage 11, energy 0.80) and region L (wage 4.50, energy 1.80); the wage 6 and energy price 1.30 are added for comparison.
Calculated values
- Annuity factor A_5
- 3.992710
- Annual gain G
- $6,960.00
- Present value
- $27,789.26
- Net present value
- $18,189.26
- Break-even wage
- $4.67
- Decision
- Adopt
At a wage of $11.00 and an energy price of $0.80, the annual gain is 11 x 720 - 0.80 x 600 - 480 = 6,960.00, worth $27,789.26 over five years at 8 percent, so NPV = 27,789.26 - 9,600 = 18,189.26: the machine pays. The wage must exceed $4.67 at this energy price. Constructed teaching numbers, not historical data.
Worked steps
- A_5 = (1 - 1.08^-5) / 0.08 = 3.992710
- G = 11 x 720 - 0.80 x 600 - 480 = 7,920.00 - 480.00 - 480 = 6,960.00
- PV = 6,960.00 x 3.992710 = 27,789.26
- NPV = 27,789.26 - 9,600 = 18,189.26
- w* = (9,600 / 3.992710 + 480.00 + 480) / 720 = 4.67
Use the idea
Price one fixed design under each location's wage and energy cost before asking why adoption differed.
Where the conclusion applies
Constant annual gain, a known life and discount rate, full-cost wages and energy priced at the point of use. Credit limits or unreliable machines can block a positive NPV.
Check your understanding: At w = 4.50 and p_e = 1.80, what is NPV?
Chapter 65 source: section "High-wage, cheap-energy mechanization".
Demonstration 2 of 4
Coal plus colonies relax the land limit
Can coal, imports, or only both together let a region outgrow its land?
Each relief channel subtracts land-equivalents from the gross need. The proposed scale fits only when the net requirement falls to the local land line.
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F = 98 is land for food and fiber and B = 62 the land equivalent of biomass energy. C is the land displaced by coal, X the land embodied in imports, D the net local requirement and L-bar the local land.
Predict first. With 140 units of land, is either coal or imports alone enough?
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Constructed example: constructed teaching numbers, not historical data. The book's invented region (land 140, needs 98 and 62, coal 14, imports 11); land of 130 and 150 is added for comparison.
Calculated values
- Gross requirement F + B
- 160
- Relief C + X
- 25
- Net requirement D
- 135
- Local land
- 140
- Balance
- Slack 5
Gross need is 98 + 62 = 160 land units. Coal relief 14 and imports 11 cut it to 160 - 25 = 135, against 140 units of local land: slack 5, so the scale fits. Constructed teaching numbers, not historical data.
Worked steps
- F + B = 98 + 62 = 160
- R = C + X = 14 + 11 = 25
- D = 160 - 25 = 135
- 140 - 135 = 5, so slack 5
Use the idea
Build a dated land-equivalent account, test each relief channel separately, then together, and report ranges for the conversion factors.
Where the conclusion applies
Land-equivalent accounting with fixed conversion factors. It does not make coal, grain and cotton physically interchangeable, and imported relief can shift costs onto other places.
Check your understanding: With coal only, what is the deficit?
Chapter 65 source: section "Great Divergence coal-and-colonies hypothesis".
Demonstration 3 of 4
Holding the whole community liable
When does collective liability make a distant merchant keep his word?
Two inequalities must hold: the fine must exceed the gain from default, and enforcing must cost the community less than the outside sanction for refusing.
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g = 18 is the gain from default. The private remedy recovers with probability 0.15 and penalty 40. The home community can fine f = 24 at cost k = 9; refusing redress exposes its members to an outside sanction S.
Predict first. If foreign authorities can impose only 7, will the community punish its cheater?
Choose an example
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Constructed example: constructed teaching numbers, not historical data. The book's invented merchant (gain 18, recovery 0.15 and 40, fine 24, cost 9, sanctions 60 and 7); a sanction of 30 is added for comparison.
Calculated values
- Expected private cost
- 6
- Default payoff, private remedy
- 12
- Default payoff if the fine is applied
- -6
- Community enforces
- Yes
- Outcome
- Performance: the fine deters
The community fine turns default into 18 - 24 = -6, and k = 9 < S = 60, so the community enforces: the threat is credible and the merchant performs. Constructed teaching numbers, not historical data.
Worked steps
- 0.15 x 40 = 6
- Private remedy: 18 - 6 = 12 > 0
- Community fine: U_D = 18 - 24 = -6
- Credibility: k = 9 versus S = 60: 9 <= 60
Use the idea
Check both stages separately: the individual's payoff from cheating and the intermediary's cost of disciplining versus the loss it faces if it does not.
Where the conclusion applies
Accurate verification of complaints and observable membership. Collective liability also punishes innocent members and can harden communal boundaries.
Check your understanding: Under the private remedy, what is the expected payoff from defaulting?
Chapter 65 source: section "Community responsibility system".
Demonstration 4 of 4
Measuring what railroads saved
How much did rail save compared with a feasible canal-and-road system?
Traffic that moves under both systems saves the full cost gap. Traffic that moves only at the rail price is worth less than the gap to its users, a triangle under linear demand.
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c_R = 0.04 is rail cost per ton-mile and Q_R = 10 million ton-miles rail traffic. c_C is the canal-and-road cost and Q_C the traffic that would move at that cost. SS is social savings and SS_0 the fixed-demand version.
Predict first. Does assuming all rail traffic would have moved anyway overstate or understate the savings?
Choose an example
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Constructed example: constructed teaching numbers, not historical data. The book's invented freight case (rail 0.04 and 10 million, alternative 0.07 and 7 million, fixed-demand 10 million); costs 0.05 and 0.10 and traffic of 5 million are added for comparison.
Calculated values
- Cost gap
- 0.03
- Rectangle
- 210,000
- Triangle
- 45,000
- Social savings
- 255,000
- Fixed-demand estimate
- 300,000
- Overstatement
- 45,000
With an alternative cost of 0.07 and 7 million ton-miles under it, social savings are 210,000 + 45,000 = 255,000. Holding all rail traffic fixed overstates the savings by 45,000. Constructed teaching numbers, not historical data.
Worked steps
- c_C - c_R = 0.07 - 0.04 = 0.03
- Rectangle = 0.03 x 7,000,000 = 210,000
- Triangle = 0.5 x 0.03 x (10,000,000 - 7,000,000) = 45,000
- SS = 210,000 + 45,000 = 255,000
- SS_0 = 0.03 x 10,000,000 = 300,000; overstatement 45,000
Use the idea
Name the alternative network first, then report savings from fixed demand down through several demand responses.
Where the conclusion applies
Constant transport costs, linear demand and a static one-period comparison with no settlement or innovation effects.
Check your understanding: What is the overstatement of the fixed-demand estimate?
Chapter 65 source: section "Railroad social savings".