Demonstration 1 of 4
Bus access, job offers and net daily pay
How much does a faster, cheaper trip raise both the chance of an offer and the value of the job?
Access works on two margins at once. Cheaper, shorter trips let more applications fit the same time and cash budget, which raises the chance of at least one offer. A cheaper daily commute raises the value of the job once it is offered.
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p is the chance that one completed application yields an offer, with independent outcomes. The weekly search budget is 15 hours and $60. Commute cost values travel time at $6 per hour and adds the fare. The job pays $18 per hour for 8 hours.
Predict first. Is the bus's gain in offer chances larger at p = 0.10 than at the book's p = 0.20?
Choose an example
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Constructed example: the chapter's hypothetical worker (wage $18, p = 0.20, budget 15 hours and $60, baseline and direct-bus trips); offer probabilities 0.10 and 0.30 are added for comparison.
Calculated values
- Transit
- Baseline
- Applications that fit
- 5
- P(at least one offer)
- 0.67232
- Commute cost per day
- $22
- Net daily pay
- $122
With baseline transit, each application takes 3 hours and $12, so 5 whole applications fit the budget. The chance of at least one offer is 1 - 0.80^5 = 0.67232. The commute costs $22 a day, leaving $122 of the $144 wage.
Worked steps
- Applications = min(15 / 3, 60 / 12) rounded down = 5
- P = 1 - (1 - 0.20)^5 = 1 - 0.32768 = 0.67232
- Daily pay = 18 x 8 = $144
- Commute cost = 2($6) + $10 = $22
- Net daily pay = $144 - $22 = $122
Use the idea
When judging a transit change, count suitable reachable vacancies and the applications a worker can actually complete, not raw job counts.
Where the conclusion applies
Independent applications with the same offer probability, a fixed weekly budget and a fixed value of time. If the reachable jobs need a credential the worker lacks, p is zero and access changes nothing.
Check your understanding: With the bus and offer probability 0.30, what is the chance of at least one offer?
Chapter 81 source: section "Spatial-mismatch hypothesis".
Demonstration 2 of 4
Bid rent and the price of a commuting mile
How fast must a household's housing bid fall with distance to keep it as well off?
Each extra mile costs the household m dollars a year, so to stay as well off it can pay m less for housing. Spread over a fixed floor area, that gives a straight bid-rent line whose slope is the commuting cost per mile per square foot. Cheaper transport, such as rail at $1,000 per mile, flattens the line.
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The household uses a fixed 1,000 square feet. Commuting costs m dollars per extra mile per year. At the 2-mile reference site the bid is $30 per square foot. The gradient is m divided by floor area.
Predict first. If commuting costs $3,000 per mile, is the 8-mile bid above or below half of the 2-mile bid?
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Constructed example: the chapter's hypothetical household (1,000 square feet, $30 at 2 miles, $2,000 per mile and the $1,000 rail case); a $3,000 cost and the 4- and 8-mile sites are added.
Calculated values
- Gradient ($ per sq ft per mile)
- $2
- Extra miles beyond 2
- 4
- Extra commute burden
- $8,000
- Bid per sq ft
- $22
- Annual housing bid
- $22,000
Bid per square foot = 30 - 4 x 2 = 22. Moving 4 miles beyond the reference site adds 4 x $2,000 = $8,000 of commuting a year. To keep other consumption unchanged the household's bid falls from $30,000 to $22,000, or $22 per square foot.
Worked steps
- Gradient = $2,000 / 1,000 sq ft = $2 per sq ft per mile
- Extra burden = 4($2,000) = $8,000
- Annual bid = $30,000 - $8,000 = $22,000
- Bid per sq ft = $22,000 / 1,000 = $22
Use the idea
To judge a site's housing bid, subtract the extra yearly commuting cost from the bid at a reference site and divide by the floor area.
Where the conclusion applies
Fixed floor area, a single central job, identical households and no amenity differences between sites. With variable floor space the gradient also reflects substitution toward larger homes.
Check your understanding: At $3,000 per mile, what is the bid per square foot at 8 miles?
Chapter 81 source: section "Alonso-Muth-Mills bid-rent gradient".
Demonstration 3 of 4
Ricardian rent as price moves the margin
Which plots earn rent, and how does a higher crop price spread rent across them?
Competition bids each plot's surplus over the margin into rent. The worst plot worth farming sets the zero point. A higher price raises surplus on every plot in proportion to its yield, so the best land gains most, and a poorer plot can be brought into use.
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S is pre-rent surplus per hectare: basket price times yield minus delivered cost. Plots A, B, C and D yield 30, 22, 14 and 12 baskets. Every plot needs the same nonland cost; D also pays 4 of transport.
Predict first. When price rises from 12 to 14, does rent on A rise by more or less than rent on C?
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Constructed example: the chapter's hypothetical plots (yields 30, 22, 14 and 12, cost 140, D's transport 4, prices 10 and 12); price 14 and nonland costs 120 and 160 are added for comparison.
Calculated values
- S_A
- 160
- S_B
- 80
- S_C
- 0
- S_D
- -24
- Plots in use
- A, B, C
At price 10 and nonland cost 140 per hectare (D adds 4 of transport), surplus is price times yield minus cost: A 10 x 30 - 140 = 160; B 10 x 22 - 140 = 80; C 10 x 14 - 140 = 0; D 10 x 12 - 144 = -24. Plot C earns exactly zero and is the no-rent margin, so rents on the better plots equal their surpluses. Plot D would lose money at this price and stays out of use.
Worked steps
- S_A = 10(30) - 140 = 160
- S_B = 10(22) - 140 = 80
- S_C = 10(14) - 140 = 0
- S_D = 10(12) - 144 = -24
Use the idea
To find land rent, compute each site's revenue minus delivered cost and measure it against the site that just breaks even.
Where the conclusion applies
Identical nonland cost per hectare, fixed yields, one crop price and competitive bidding for land. Delivered net value, not yield alone, ranks the plots.
Check your understanding: At price 14 and cost 140, what are the surpluses on A, B, C and D?
Chapter 81 source: section "Ricardian Rent".
Demonstration 4 of 4
Scale, coordination loss and utilization
When does a large press give the estate lower cost per ton than a small producer?
A large fixed cost is cheap per ton only when spread over many tons. Coordination loss raises the cost of the last tons, and a poor harvest leaves the press underused, so the scale advantage depends on throughput and organization.
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TC is total cost and AC = TC / q average cost per ton. The estate's press costs 1,200 a year and inputs cost 25 per ton up to 80 tons, then v per ton. The small producer's average cost is 45.
Predict first. At 50 tons, is the estate cheaper or dearer per ton than the 20-ton producer?
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Constructed example: the chapter's hypothetical estate (press 1,200, 25 per ton, 34 beyond 80 tons, price 42, 100 and 50 tons) and small producer; 80 tons and price 46 are added.
Calculated values
- Total cost
- 3,700
- Average cost
- 37.0
- Revenue
- 4,200
- Profit before land cost
- 500
- Versus small producer AC 45
- cheaper
TC = 1,200 + 25(80) + 25(20) = 3,700, so average cost is 37.0; 37.0 is below the small producer's 45, a saving of 8.0 per ton. Revenue 42 x 100 = 4,200 leaves 500 before land cost. The last 20 tons cost 25 each, the same as the first 80.
Worked steps
- TC = 1,200 + 25(80) + 25(20) = 3,700
- AC = 3,700 / 100 = 37.0
- Revenue = 42(100) = 4,200
- Profit = 4,200 - 3,700 = 500
Use the idea
Compare average cost at the throughput you expect, not at capacity, and price in the extra cost of monitoring large operations.
Where the conclusion applies
One crop and price, a fixed press cost and constant variable cost within each tier. Land cost is left out of profit.
Check your understanding: With coordination loss, 100 tons and price 46, what is profit before land cost?
Chapter 81 source: section "Economies of Scale and the Latifundia".