Demonstration 1 of 4
Habits lag practice
How quickly does a habit catch up with a change in reinforced practice?
Habit closes only a fraction alpha of the gap to practice each period, so it lags any change and stalls if the reinforcement is withdrawn.
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h_t is the share of employees for whom local resolution is habitual, x_t the share who practice it in period t, and alpha the speed at which habit updates toward practice.
Predict first. If evaluation reverts to the old rule (practice stays 0.20), where does h_2 land?
Choose an example
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Constructed example: hypothetical teaching numbers, not historical data. The book's claims office has h_0 = 0, practice 0.20 then 0.80 or 0.20, and alpha = 0.25; alpha = 0.50 and practice 0.50 are added.
Calculated values
- h_1
- 0.0500
- h_2
- 0.2375
- h_3
- 0.3781
- h_4
- 0.4836
- Gap to practice at t = 4
- 0.3164
Hypothetical teaching numbers, not historical data. Practice is 0.20 in period 0 and 0.80 afterwards. With updating speed 0.25, h_2 = 0.75 x 0.0500 + 0.25 x 0.80 = 0.2375, and by period 4 the habit is 0.4836, still 0.3164 below current practice.
Worked steps
- h_1 = 0.75(0) + 0.25(0.20) = 0.0500
- h_2 = 0.75(0.0500) + 0.25(0.80) = 0.2375
- h_3 = 0.75(0.2375) + 0.25(0.80) = 0.3781
- h_4 = 0.75(0.3781) + 0.25(0.80) = 0.4836
Use the idea
When a reform changes rules or tools, expect behavior to adjust gradually and track whether incentives keep reinforcing the new practice.
Where the conclusion applies
A fixed updating speed and an instructional equation, not an estimate attributed to Veblen.
Check your understanding: With alpha = 0.50 and practice 0.80 after period 0, what is h_3?
Chapter 91 source: section "Institutional habits and cumulative adaptation".
Demonstration 2 of 4
Moral terms and the investment choice
Can moral terms in preferences tip an owner from consumption toward investment?
Moral terms shift the comparison by a fixed number of points; they tip close calls but cannot justify a clearly inferior project.
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Each workshop has 100 discretionary units. A machine costs 60 today and returns the chosen payoff next year; future units are discounted at 0.50. With moral terms, luxury above 40 costs 10 points and investing adds 5 stewardship points.
Predict first. With moral terms on, does the norm still favor investment when the payoff drops to 55?
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Constructed example: hypothetical teaching numbers, not historical data. The book's workshops have 100 units, cost 60, payoffs 78 and 55, discount 0.50 and moral terms 10 and 5; a payoff of 90 is added.
Calculated values
- Consume plan score
- 75.0
- Invest plan score
- 84.0
- Choice
- Invest
Hypothetical teaching numbers, not historical data. For Elias (moral terms on) with a machine payoff of 78, the consume plan scores 70 + 0.50(30) - 10 = 75.0 and the invest plan 40 + 0.50(78) + 5 = 84.0, so investing wins, 84.0 against 75.0.
Worked steps
- Consume plan: 70 + 0.50(30) - 10 = 75.0
- Invest plan: 40 + 0.50(78) + 5 = 84.0
- Result: investing wins, 84.0 against 75.0
Use the idea
When attributing saving or investment to values, show the counterfactual with the moral terms removed and everything else fixed.
Where the conclusion applies
Identical productivity, credit and discounting for both owners; the example estimates no historical community.
Check your understanding: With moral terms off and payoff 90, which plan is chosen?
Chapter 91 source: section "Protestant ethic mechanism".
Demonstration 3 of 4
Family versus institutional transmission
Which raises the next generation's share of a trait more: stronger family effort or outside exposure?
Family transmission works only through the minority's own children, so its effect is scaled by x_t. Exposure reaches every child without the trait, so it can move the share much faster.
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x_t = 0.30 is the share of parents with trait A. tau_A and tau_B are the chances each type passes on its own trait directly; otherwise children copy a random adult. Institutional exposure reaches that share of children without the trait after family socialization.
Predict first. Which raises the share more: tau_A rising to 0.80, or 40 percent institutional exposure?
Choose an example
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Constructed example: hypothetical teaching numbers, not historical data. The book's population has x = 0.30, tau_A = 0.50 and 0.80, tau_B = 0.20 and exposure 0.40; tau_B = 0.50 is added.
Calculated values
- P(A | A)
- 0.650
- P(A | B)
- 0.240
- x_t+1 after family
- 0.3630
- Share after institutional exposure
- 0.3630
Hypothetical teaching numbers, not historical data. Starting from 30 percent, family transmission gives x_t+1 = 0.30 x 0.650 + 0.70 x 0.240 = 0.3630. Institutional exposure of 0.00 then brings the share to 0.3630.
Worked steps
- P(A|A) = 0.50 + 0.50(0.30) = 0.650
- P(A|B) = 0.80(0.30) = 0.240
- x_t+1 = 0.30(0.650) + 0.70(0.240) = 0.3630
- With exposure: 0.3630 + 0.00(1 - 0.3630) = 0.3630
Use the idea
When explaining a change in values, name the channel: parents, peers or institutions give very different speeds.
Where the conclusion applies
One generation, random oblique copying and independent exposure, as in the chapter's stylized example.
Check your understanding: With tau_A = 0.50, tau_B = 0.50 and no exposure, what is x_t+1?
Chapter 91 source: section "Cultural transmission".
Demonstration 4 of 4
When does tradition survive?
How much environmental instability can a tradition of copying parents survive?
Copying saves the learning cost but fails when the environment has changed. The more stable the environment, the larger the share that can rely on tradition.
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beta = 60 is the payoff from the correct action, kappa the cost of learning the current optimal action, and Delta the chance the environment is redrawn between generations. x* is the equilibrium share of traditionalists who copy rather than learn.
Predict first. At Delta = 0.35, does any traditionalist share survive?
Choose an example
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Constructed example: hypothetical teaching numbers, not historical data. The book's values are beta = 60, kappa = 18 and Delta of 0.10, 0.25 and 0.35; kappa = 24 is added.
Calculated values
- x*
- 0.741
- Threshold kappa / beta
- 0.30
- Numerator kappa - Delta beta
- 12.0
Hypothetical teaching numbers, not historical data. With learning cost 18 and instability 0.10, x* = (18 - 0.10 x 60) / (18 x 0.90) = 12.0 / 16.2, so a traditionalist share of 0.741 survives. Tradition disappears once instability passes 18 / 60 = 0.30.
Worked steps
- Numerator: 18 - 0.10(60) = 12.0
- Denominator: 18(0.90) = 16.2
- x* = 12.0 / 16.2 = 0.741
- Threshold: 18 / 60 = 0.30
Use the idea
Expect inherited practices to persist where conditions are stable across generations and to fade quickly where they are not.
Where the conclusion applies
The chapter's stylized source model with a fixed payoff and learning cost.
Check your understanding: With kappa = 24 and Delta = 0.25, what is x*?
Chapter 91 source: section "Cultural persistence".