Chapter 21: separate solutions
Question 1
Compute default price of anarchy.
At the default (demand 1, zero-cost shortcut) equilibrium sends all traffic through the shortcut, so each congestible edge carries 1 and the social time is 2(1)(1)=2. The social optimum uses no shortcut, 0.5 on each outer route, with social time 1(0.5+1)=1.5. The price of anarchy is 2/1.5=4/3, about 1.333.
Question 2
Why exclude toll revenue from social travel time?
A toll moves money from the traveller to whoever collects it; nobody spends extra time because of it. The objective is total travel time, so adding toll payments would count the same transfer as if it were delay and change the quantity being minimized. The toll belongs in private cost, where it changes route choices, and stays out of social cost.
Question 3
Compute transfer social optimum.
The optimal shortcut flow is z=capacity(constant_time-overhead)-demand=1(1-0)-0.5=0.5, which already lies within [0,0.5], so z=0.5. The total social time is (0.5+0.5)^2/(2(1))+1(0.5-0.5)+0(0.5)=0.5.